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The Spanish role regional security 
This third and last article of the 
series on the Mediterranean region 
analyses the Spanish contribution 
to regional security in the mentio- 
ned area. 
The specific situation of Spain at 
the level of international relations 
has not allowed yet the formula- 
tion of its security policy. This 
1,ack of definition in security mat- 
ters is influencing Spanish Medite- 
rranean politics. 
If the analysis of the Mediterra- 
nean region is approached from 
the perspective of the East-West 
conflict, the role of Spain in this 
region is crearly defined by the 
Spanish-American agreements of 
1953. Furthermore, the presence 
of US bases in Spain has been of 
considerable importance in the de- 
velopment of US strategy for the 
Middle East. 
The evolution of the American/ 
Atlantic strategies (extension of 
the Southern flank, division of la- 
bour) has coincided in time with 
Spanish integration into Western 
defense structures. Whether vie- 
wed from the perspective of bila- 
teral relations with the United Sta- 
tes, or from its foreseeable role 
in multilateral Western defense, 
Spain appears to have an active 
and well defined role to play. 
The assignment to Spain of a 
specialized role in the defense of 
the Western part of the Mediterra- 
nean coincides with unilateral 
planning by the Spanish authori- 
ties as to the reinforcement of the 
Baleares - Gibraltar - Canaries axis, 
Plans which give priority to a view 
of the Mediterranean area in terms 
of military security. 
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The IMF and the lnternational Monetary 
~ y s t e m :  fourty years after Bretton Woods 
In July o f ,  1984, the IMF rea- 
ched fourty years of existence. As 
lcnown, between the first and twen- 
ty-second of July of 1944, in Wash- 
ington Mount Hotel in Bretton 
Woods, a conference took place. 
Here two of the most important 
international economic organisms 
were created: the Internátional 
Monetary Fund and the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the World Bank). 
Bearing in mind the function of 
both organisms in the internatio- 
nal field, we should comment the 
significance of the Bretton Woods 
Conference and wath effects the 
financial and monetary rules that 
were created there, had. Rules seen 
as a support to the institutions 
and a way to restore the world 
economy, after a world crisis (from 
on 1929) and after the second 
World War, at that moment pass- 
ing its final months, the situation 
being clearly in favour of the allied 
forces. 
However, although it is a dou- 
ble birthday, in this article I will 
only talk about the International 
Monetary Fund, of which its in- 
ternational activities always have 
been controversial. I also will not 
talk about the World Bank, that, 
after a stage directed towards de- 
velopment when McNamara was 
its president, has now moved into 
a more orthodox bancary stage, 
with its new president Clausen - a 
man nearer to Reagans attitudes. 
Arms production in Latin America 
In addition to the purchase of 
weapons from abroad, arms ma- 
nufacture at home is one of the 
fastest expanding, most important 
and most profitable industries in 
many countries in the Third World. 
In Latin America, for example, at 
the beginning of the 1960s, only 
two countries had a significant po- 
tential to produce major weapons. 
By 1983 as many as eight countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom- 
bia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Ve- 
nezuela) had becoma producers of 
some major weapons. A similar 
trend has developed for small wea- 
pons. Two decades ago only four 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, the 
Dominican Republic and Mexico) 
were able to produce such wea- 
pons; now more than 10 countries 
in the region can do so. Thus, in- 
dlgenous productioii meets a grow- 
ing part of the weapon require- 
ments of Latin America. Soine of 
these countries event export wea- 
pons; Brazil has become the tenth 
largest arms exporter in the world 
and the first among Third World 
exporters of major weapons, thus 
emerging as a serious competitor 
to the traditional arms producers 
of the industrialized world in the 
arms export business. In  contrast, 
Latin American arms imports have 
not been large in Third World 
terms. 
Whilst the raison d'entre of do- 
mestic arms production is often 
political and strategic, economists 
have been called upon to justify 
the investment made in the arms 
jndustry in terms of the contribu- 
tion made to a country's economic 
development. For a variety of rea- 
sons, both philosophical and tech- 
nical, even the most sophisticated 
techniques of economic analysis 
provide no clear-cut answers to 
this question. In the first place, 
<<economic developmenta may only 
with great difficulty be defined ob- 
jectively. Whilst it may generally 
be accepted that a growjng GDP 
is a sign of economic growth, it is 
hard to agree that <<developmenta 
has taken place if the additional 
income remains in a few hands, 
has been achieved by economic 
and/or political repression of the 
masses or acquired at the expense 
of future generations. Secondly, 
economic indicators, often statis- 
tically complex measures, are par- 
ticularly elusive in the case of the 
strategically-sensitive arms indus- 
try. 
In this section of the paper, the 
arguments commonly put for- 
ward to support or criticize do- 
mestic arms industries in Third 
World countries will be reviewed, 
with specific reference to economic 
security. The reader should have 
in mind the hypothesis, <<Would the 
same amount of investment in 
some other project or projects 
achieve the same economic result 
in terms of some desired econo- 
mic growth?),. Should this be the 
case, the decision to invest in a 
weapons industry instead of, for 
example, a hydroelectric power 
scheme, must rest on non-econo- 
mic grounds. 
The prohibition of the intervention fijteen 
years after the Declaration 2625 (XXV). 
An analysis of the Nicaragua case 
Non-intervention has been for a 
long time one of the principles of 
international Law more important 
in the Latin-American area, and 
has been cons,acrated in the O.A.S. 
Charter. Even if in the U.N. Char- 
ter ist is not expressly mentioned, 
many authors consider that it de- 
rives frolm necessary inference 
from article 2,l of the U.N. Char- 
ter, being a consequence of the so- 
vereing equality of States. The prin- 
ciple of non-intervention has been 
recognized by the interim measu- 
res of the International Court of 
Justice, in the Nicaragua vs. U.S.A. 
Case, as one of the more fundamen- 
tal trends of conduct of all States, 
and it is considered as embodied 
in the U.N. Charter. 
No11 intervention has a wider sco- 
pe than the principle of the arti- 
cle 2,4 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which forbids the use or 
the threat of use of force. The last 
principle only prohibits armed for- 
ce, and non-intervention prohibits 
the use of armed force, but also 
economic politic or diplomatic for- 
ce, objectively considered to be 
enough to force another State 
against its will, and in a form for- 
bidden by international Law. 
I t  is evident that this definition 
is very vague, but it has been pre- 
cised by Declaration 2625 (XXV) 
of the G.A. of the U.N. In many 
types of conduct, it coincides with 
the use of direct or indirect armed 
Porce, and even with agression, as 
defined by Decl. 3314 (XXIX) of 
the G.A. of the United Nations. In 
a single act, one State might be 
committing an aggression, an ille- 
gal use of force and an interven- 
tion. 
In the article, it is analyzed the 
so-called c(rights,, to intervention, 
with an exam of the latest exam- 
ples of the practice of the States: 
the raids of Larnaca airport, in 
Mogadiscio and in Entebbe, and 
the failed raid in Iran by the U.S.A. 
In all these cases the intervention 
was made to protect the lifes of 
nationals and had a limited scope. 
Some authors sustain that they 
were not forbidden by internatio- 
nal Law; but the intervention in 
defense of nationals can be used 
easily in other cases. So it was done 
in the invasion of the island of Gre- 
nada by the U.S.A., which also ar- 
gumented officially that the acted 
with the permission of the only le- 
gal representant of the State, the 
Governor General, and to be autho- 
rized to intervene by the Organi- 
zation of East Caribbean States 
Treaty. All these justification have 
been strongly criticized even by the 
same U.S. internationalists. 
In the case of the intervention 
of United States in Nicaragua, the 
opinion of the author is that all the 
actions of the U.S. Government, 
directly or indirectly by an official 
Government Office as the C.I.A., 
subsidizing, arming and military 
sustaining the ((guerrilleros), of the 
F.D.N. and of the A.R.D.E. suppo- 
se an aggression, an illegal use of 
of the armed force and one inter- 
vention in the interna1 affairs of 
Nicaragua. But there are also other 
type of non-armed interventions: 
the use of economic force to collap- 
se the Nicaraguan economy, the 
diplomatic pressures over France, 
Spain and the countries of the cen- 
tro-american area to avoid any kind 
of help to the Sandinist regime, 
and so on. 
The political-criminal scheme 
of the Argentinian democracy 
The political transition from au- 
thoritarian system to democracy in 
Argentina constitutes a unique case 
in the recent history of peripheral 
capitalism. 
The main project which inspi- 
red the coming to power of mili- 
tary dictatorships, especially since 
1976, required the application of a 
rigid system of social control in 
order to contain popular demands. 
This system of social control re- 
lied on the so-called ((National Se- 
curity Doctrine)) which became the 
guide-line of the inhuman policy 
of the Criminal law, based on viola- 
tion of human rights and constitu- 
tional guarantees. 
The transition to democracy en- 
tailed the development of a legal 
system under the rule o€ law. Wi- 
thin this framework, the Argenti- 
ne government has begun to bring 
to trial those responsible for the 
Penal law of the ((National Securi- 
ty), doctrine. 
Assuring the supremacy of the 
Constitution required a revision of 
the doctrine of acontinued juris- 
diction, which was propagated by 
the Supreme Court of Justice after 
the first coup, and supported by 
the most conservative layers. This 
doctrine maintains the jurisdiction 
of inconstitutional legislation im- 
plemented by the de facto govern- 
ments. 
The occasion for the revision of 
the cccontinued jurisdiction,, doc- 
trine was the derogation of the de 
facto law known as the ccauto-am- 
nestys. This law was imposed by 
the last military dictatorship to co- 
ver up the crimes committed by 
members of the Armed Forces and 
Security Services. 
The current democratic govern- 
ment's approach to Criminal law 
has been dominated by the treat- 
ment of questions related both to 
actiosn carried out by the military 
repression in the period from 1976- 
1983, and to the resolution of the 
situations of those persons either 
condemned or now being tried by 
the military courts. 
The inicial strategy of the govern- 
iag political party with respect to 
ccthe military questionn was to 
leave the prosecution of the mili- 
tary leaders responsible for the 
grave human rights violations of 
1976-1983 period to their ((natural 
judgesn, i.e. to military justice. 
The refusa1 of the military courts 
to carry out Alfonsin's order to 
prosecute the n~ilitary high com- 
mand. members of the three mili- 
tary Juntas, has made it necesary 
for the civil courts to continue 
with their trials. This development 
has been a serious source of ten- 
sion between the military hierar- 
chy and the Argentine political class 
for the last months. 
Recent legislation has provided 
for such advances as the right of 
appeal to civil courts of sentences 
dictated by military tribunals, the 
commutation of the sentences of 
the convicted, and the special com- 
putation of the prison sentences 
of those persons tried between 
March 24, 1976 and December 10, 
1983. 
By means of law entitled (<Pro- 
tection of Constitutional Order and 
Democracya, reforms have been in- 
troduced in the Criminal Law Pro- 
cedures. This provides for legal 
means to protect the National 
Constitution from both threats and 
acts against the democratic political 
system. These laws specify in detail 
the legal procedures to be applied 
to persons tried in the future. 
Monetary fines have been increa- 
sed, to take into account the deva- 
luation of the Argentinian curren- 
cy. Also, penalities have been made 
more severe for the crime of tor- 
ture, now considered equivalent to 
simple homicide, which demons- 
trates the social repudiation of 
the recent experience. 
Finally, the procedure of habeas 
corpus has just been legislated, in- 
troducing a wide latitudes with res- 
pect to all matters concerning its 
application, and giving greater fle- 
xibility to its implementation. 
I t  is clear that the orientation 
towards Criminal law of Argentina's 
democratic regime has been condi- 
tioned by the political framework 
within which the process of the 
political transition has developed.. 
This situation can be expected to 
continue for the foreseeable futu- 
re, and the results will depend on 
the tensions and conflicts within 
the majority political forces. But 
even more, the results will depend 
on the outcome of the struggle bet- 
ween civil society and the military 
apparatus. 
The ({Total South African strateg y >> and 
the of Nkomati agreement 
The Nkomati agreement, signed 
between South Africa and Mozam- 
bique, the sixteenth of March of 
1984 is the result of the application 
of the south african cctotal strate- 
gyn, with Mozambique. This doc- 
trine borned when the Vorster po- 
licy, known as ccstillness exercise,,, 
collapsed. The total strategy are 
Pieter Botha and the military mo- 
nopolis alliance. The interna1 as- 
pect is based on the introduction 
of severa1 reformations, giving spe- 
cia1 importance to the constitutio- 
nal one, and giving parlamentary 
representation to half-castes and 
Asians. 
In the regional policy, the total 
strategy tries to reach two goals: 
one is to reduce the support that 
Southern African States give to the 
National Eiberation Movement, the 
other is to build a constellation of 
allied states, with the Southern 
African countries to create more 
dependency with South Africa. 
But many factors were needed 
for the arising of such agreement 
between these two countries with 
so different ideologies: the herita- 
gi of a colonial economy with very 
special characteristics, as the inte- 
gration of the southern Africa to 
the south african economy and a 
lack of cadre with a high illiteracy 
level. And also the developing plans 
failure. The Zimbawe independen- 
cy war with big economic and hu- 
man costs. South African boycot to 
Mozambique's trading ports. The 
South African suspension of the 
gold's special prize. A decrease in 
the entrance of Mozambique's mi- 
ners in Transval mines. The direct 
actions of South African army in 
Martola, following the instructions 
of Reagan's doctrine of coercive di- 
plomacy. The actions of the pro- 
South African group RNM, which 
destroyed Mozambique's infrastruc- 
tures. All these elements togherher 
provoked in Mozambique a deep 
crisis which forced the Samora Ma- 
chel regime 'to accept the agree- 
ment with South Africa if he wan- 
ted to continue in the government 
and at the same time save the ru- 
les of Leninist-Marxist state. After 
the agreement, the RNM continued 
with their actions so Mozambique's 
government had to sign a agreement 
with the RNM to end the hostilities 
under South African supervision. 
The group struck hardest by this 
agreement, was the National Afri- 
can Congress, loosing its South 
African asylum possibilities. 
